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INTRODUCTION
The jurisdictional statement, nature of proceedings, statement of issues on appeal and statement of facts are adquately
covered in the Defendant's opening brief.

This brief is sub-

mitted in reply to Respondent's brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There was neither strict nor substantial compliance with the
mandate of Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
when the Defendant entered his guilty plea in this case.
Although the Defendant executed an Affidavit when he pleaded
guilty, the trial court did not determine on the record that the
Defendant understood the nature and elements of the offense to
which he entered his guilty plea.

Significantly, the Amended

Information was not read to the Defendant.

Moreover, counsel and

the trial court identified the offense with a variety of different names.

The Defendant never admitted any facts on the record

which constituted the offense of Attempted Aggravated Sexual
Abuse of a Child.

The trial court neither read the facts or

elements recited in the "Affidavit of Defendant" nor requested
that the Defendant acknowledge those facts or elements.
Similarly, the trial judge did not advise the Defendant on the
record of what sentence might be imposed before the guilty plea
was received.
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

(REPLY TO POINT I OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF)
THE DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT ENTERED
IN COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11(e)(4) AND (5) OF
THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
The State's interpretation of State v. Thurston,, 781 P. 2d
1296 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) is creative but imprecise.

The State

interprets this case to mean that at least one panel of the Court
of Appeals has abandoned the strict compliance rule articulated
in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) and
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).

However,

the panel writing the decision in State v. Thurston made no such
statement.
fashion.

The State may wish to interpret Thurston in such a

But there is no clear prenouncement in Thurston that

Vasilacopulos and Valencia were either abandoned or overruled by
the panel which authored Thurston.
Moreover, the facts in Thurston involve a unique Rule 11
situation.

Thurston really involved the interpretation of the

principle that a defendant is entitled to specific performance of
a plea negotiation; See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971).

Thurston plead guilty to two counts of distribution of a

controlled substance.

The State agreed to dismiss the remaining

charges against the defendant and to recommend probation rather

2

than incarceration.

The State, by and through its deputy county

attorney, fulfilled all the terms of the plea negotiation.

That

is to say, the State did dismiss the additional charges and did
affirmatively recommend probation rather than incarceration.
However, the unique problem which arose in Thurston was that
notwithstanding the deputy county attorney's affirmative recommendation for probation, the presentence report included the
opinion of the investigating officer "that fifteen years was not
a long enough term of incarceration for the defendant."

The

Court of Appeals concluded that an investigating police offer is
not bound by a prosecutor's plea bargain to recommend probation.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals decided that the defendant's
plea bargain agreement had not been breached.
The defendant in Thurston also argued that his guilty plea
was involuntary and should be stricken because he entered the
plea in reliance upon the State's recommendation for probation,
and that his reliance was misplaced because of the investigating
police officer's contrary sentencing recommendation.

In consid-

ering that contention, the Court of Appeals reviewed the record
and determined that the defendant had been fully informed of his
rights and the consequences of the guilty plea.

In dismissing

the defendant's contention that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea, the Court of Appeals noted that the "defendant's

3

mere subjective belief as to a potential sentence is insufficient
to invalidate a guilty plea as involuntary or unknowing."

781

P.2d at 1302.
The facts in Thurston are unique and completely different
from the Rule 11 violation in the instant case.

Regardless of

what standard was articulated by the Court of Appeals in
Thurston, whether it was the record as a whole or strict compliance, there simply was no Rule 11 violation.
The State has also argued that Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d
1148 (Utah 1989), and State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah
1988), stand for the proposition that the record as a whole test
is the test to be applied regardless of whether the plea in issue
was a pre- or post-Gibbons plea.
State is wrong in this regard.

The Defendant submits that the

Jolivet, Copeland, and State v.

Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), all involve guilty pleas entered
prior to State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987).

This is a

significant distinction.
Although it is true that all three of these cases discuss
the substantial compliance or record as a whole test, they are
pre-Gibbons cases.
application.

State v. Gibbons was not given retroactive

That was so because a new rul€* of criminal proce-

dure constituting a clear break with the past will not be applied
retroactively.

Rather, in those circumstances where a defendant
4

challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea under Rule 11
after State v. Gibbons was decided, but when the guilty plea was
actually entered prior to the pronouncement of State v. Gibbons,
supra, this Court has adopted the record as a whole test.

See

Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and Brooks v. Morris,
709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985).
Jolivet, Copeland, and Kay are not inconsistent with the
rule announced in State v. Gibbons:
Because of the importance of compliance with
Rule 11(e) in Boykin, the law places the burden
of establishing compliance with those requirements on the trial judge .... the use of a
sufficient affidavit can promote efficiency,
but an affidavit should be only the starting
point, not an end point, in the pleading process .... the trial judge should then review
the statements in the affidavit with the defendant, question the defendant concerning his
understanding of it, and fulfill the other
requirements imposed by Section 77-35-11 on the
record before accepting the guilt plea.
(Emphasis added).
740 P.2d at 1313.
In the instant matter, on the issues of whether the Defendant understood the nature and elements of the offense as well as
the possible sentence, the State can only rely upon the "Affidavit of Defendant."

The State's contention that the Defendant had

previously appeared in Circuit Court where he had waived his
preliminary hearing is hardly any support for the proposition
5

that the Defendant understood either the nature or the elements
of the offense to which he pleaded guilty.

Similarly, the

State's argument that because the Defendant's counsel waived a
formal reading of the Information and acknowledged that he (the
defense counsel) had received a copy of the Information hardly
supports the ineluctible conclusion that the Defendant understood
the nature and elements of the offense to which he was pleading
guilty.
CONCLUSION
This is not a case even remotely similar to Jolivet or
Copeland

where the record clearly demonstrates substantial

efforts by the trial court to ensure that the Defendant understood the nature and elements of the offenses to which they
pleaded guilty.

In contrast, there is nothing but an affidavit

in the instant case.

The record in the instant matter estab-

lishes substantial confusion over even the title of the offense,
much less the nature and elements of the offense.

The record as

a whole does not establish that the Defendant understood either
the nature and elements of the offense or the possible sentence
that could be imposed.
DATED this

day of

, 1990.

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.,
Attorney for Appellant
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